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Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’ Law Firm Matter in Deal 
Litigation?* 
Adam B. Badawi & David H. Webber 
This Article examines how the stock market reacts to the filing of lawsuits against 
mergers and acquisitions targets as the quality of the plaintiffs’ law firm varies. Our 
primary dataset includes all cases of this type filed in the Delaware Chancery Court from 
November 2003–September 2008. We group the law firms that file these suits into higher 
and lower quality categories using several quantitative and qualitative measures. We 
hypothesize that target firm share value should reflect the likelihood that litigation will 
result in an increase in merger consideration. This effect is likely to depend, at least in 
part, on law firm quality. Our evidence is broadly consistent with this hypothesis, and we 
find similar results when we restrict the analysis to those cases filed several days after the 
announcement of the deal. Likewise, we find that the effect of law firm quality on firm value 
endures when we include cases filed after the beginning of the financial crisis. We discuss 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The likelihood of a merger or acquisition being subject to litigation has skyrocketed 
in recent years.1 Nearly every deal involving a public company gets challenged in court 
soon after announcement of the transaction.2 The universality of these challenges has 
generated significant controversy about the value of this litigation. A cynical take is that 
many of these cases are strike suits. They are shakedowns by plaintiffs’ lawyers who know 
that the drive to close the deal will lead merger partners to settle even frivolous claims to 
make them go away.3 Defense lawyers play along because they can purchase claim 
preclusion through a broad release and a negligible attorneys’ fee.4 According to this view, 
only lawyers benefit from these suits, not shareholders.5 Skeptics explain away 
shareholder-friendly case outcomes litigated by experienced plaintiff law firms as having 
been produced by something other than the lawsuit itself. A more optimistic view suggests 
that law firm skill at case selection and litigation can affect case outcomes independent of 
deal characteristics. Under this view, lawyers are not just roosters taking credit for the 
sunrise. They matter, and so does the time and effort expended to sort out the good firms 
from the bad. 
In this Article, we develop evidence about how market participants value the filing of 
these merger lawsuits. Our primary focus is on the law firms involved in these cases. 
Lawsuits that result in a price increase for target shareholders will likely command the 
highest legal fees and will attract the highest quality counsel.6 One might expect that the 
involvement of those law firms in a lawsuit signals the possibility of a significant 
settlement for shareholders. Upon observing the presence of a high quality law firm, the 
market should anticipate a positive settlement leading to an increase in merger 
 
 1.  See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012 1–2 (Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. 
Governance & Fin. Reg., Working Paper No. 236, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216727 (noting that 87.3% of transactions in 2010 
experienced litigation, a figure which rose to 91.4% of transactions in 2011). 
 2.  See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holder Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 943 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“As this Court has previously 
observed, the first cases often appear minutes or hours after the announcement with others following within a 
matter of days.”). 
 3.  See Liz Hoffman, First Rule of Mergers: To Fight is to Lose, WALL ST. J. (March 26, 2014, 12:06 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303949704579457414255774166 (“It is almost always 
cheaper and less risky for companies to settle, especially when facing lawsuits in multiple courts. One unfavorable 
ruling can derail a deal for months.”). 
 4.  See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. 
L. REV. 1053, 1082 (2013) (discussing how when defendant corporations face multiple claims in multiple 
jurisdictions, “[t]hey can ‘shop’ for the quickest and cheapest settlement from the various plaintiffs teams”). 
 5.  See Rodney Yap et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for Investors, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 16, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-
investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals (“Of 57 such investor class actions settled or otherwise 
concluded [in Delaware] in 2010 and 2011, 40—or 70 [%]—made money for plaintiffs’ lawyers but not clients . 
. . .”). 
 6.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 15 (Mar. 2012), 
http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2012/Cornerstone-Research-Shareholder-MandA-
Litigation-03-2012.pdf (noting that during 2010 and 2011, “the highest [attorneys] fee was in the Del Monte 
Foods settlement, which also included a large payment to Del Monte’s shareholders”). 
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consideration, and consequently, would react positively to the filing of suit by such a firm.7 
At the other end of the spectrum, the less skilled law firms may be less choosy when they 
file suit. These firms survive by collecting small legal fees in numerous cases.8 The fact 
that these law firms decide to file a case may trigger the expectation that not much benefit 
is likely to flow to shareholders as a consequence of the lawsuit. Here, we would expect a 
negative market reaction relative to the filing effect when a high quality firm brings a case. 
In defining lawyer quality we focus on lawyerly skill and on case selectivity. Skill 
should matter for the obvious reason that the energy and diligence that better lawyers bring 
to cases should enable those lawyers to produce more meaningful settlements in merger 
cases. As Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery has put it, higher 
quality law firms should be better able to produce “tangible benefits for shareholders.”9 
Higher quality lawyers should also be able to make better choices about the cases they 
file. That selectivity should indicate to the market that a case has a larger likelihood of a 
positive recovery for shareholders. The market will only react positively to such filing if it 
anticipates a positive recovery—that is, if it believes that suits brought by top law firms 
can add value. But if selectivity is part of what differentiates better and worse firms, it does 
not follow that the market should put substantial weight on the presence of a lesser firm. If 
those firms file indiscriminately, they will sometimes file a complaint in good cases and 
sometimes file in poor cases. Instead, what we expect to matter is the presence of a lesser 
quality firm and the absence of the better firms. Those cases should provide a signal of the 
cases where litigation is unlikely to provide much, if any, benefit to shareholders. In 
contrast to our hypotheses suggesting that the market reaction should vary according to the 
quality of the law firm, litigation skeptics would expect to see no market reaction to the 
law firms at all. Instead, as described more fully below, they would expect to see the market 
reacting to the deal itself, to its price terms, to its market-relevant characteristics, but not 
to the plaintiff law firms themselves, who indiscriminately file strike suits without regard 
to merit, according to the litigation-skeptic theory. 
To gauge law firm quality we use both objective and subjective measures. The 
objective measures include data on the number and amount of settlements that law firms 
secure. For higher quality firms, we rely on the annual Securities Class Action Services 
(SCAS) list of the plaintiffs’ firms with highest aggregate securities settlements published 
by RiskMetrics. While securities cases and merger cases are different,10 of course, many 
 
 7.  See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law–Part I: Technique and 
Corporate Litigation (John M. Olin Ctr. L., Econ. & Pub. Pol’y Working Papers, Paper No. 259, 2001), 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=lepp_papers (discussing event 
study methodology). 
 8. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 959 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Traditional plaintiffs’ law 
firms who bring class and derivative lawsuits on behalf of stockholders without meaningful economic stakes can 
best be viewed as entrepreneurial litigators who manage a portfolio of cases to maximize their returns through 
attorneys’ fees.”). 
 9.  Transcript of Motion to Consolidate and Organize Council and the Court’s Ruling at 6:3–6, In re 
Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., (No. 6094-VCL), 2011 WL 6382523 (Del. Ch. Jan 13, 2011).  
 10.  Merger litigation involves shareholders challenging the terms of a transaction involving the company 
in which they own stock. See David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical 
Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
907, 909 (2014) [hereinafter Webber, Private Policing] (describing the typical deal litigation case brought by 
shareholders). In a securities class action, shareholders are alleging that the board of directors or officers of the 
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of these firms also have active merger practice groups.11 Because both securities class 
actions and acquisition-related cases rely on assessments of the law firm quality when 
designating who will represent the lead plaintiff,12 firms that have high quality securities 
practices can be expected to care about the reputation of their merger practices, and vice 
versa. We include any firm with an active deal litigation practice that appeared on the 
SCAS top ten list at least once during the time frame of our sample (2003–2008). 
For the subjective assessment of higher quality firms we rely on the list compiled by 
Legal 500. These rankings draw on publicly available information and on private 
information from the law firms themselves.13 There is a list of the top merger and 
acquisitions litigators and we classify any of the plaintiff-side firms as a top firm if they 
appeared on the most-recent version of the list. 
For the objective side of the lower end of firms we rely on a study of settlements in 
merger cases prepared by Bloomberg. The study tracks law firms that filed a significant 
number of merger cases in 2011 and orders them based on the number of positive 
settlements they were able to secure during 2011.14 We classify firms at the bottom of the 
list—those who were unable to recover for shareholders or were only rarely able to do so—
as lower quality firms. We also include the subjective assessments of the Delaware 
judiciary in our classification. In the course of selecting lead counsel and blessing 
settlements, Delaware judges will sometimes comment on firm quality.15 We group those 
that receive the harshest comments in the lower quality category.16 
We develop evidence that these quality classifications are consistent with the views 
of public market participants. In cases where recoveries are most likely—such as 
management buyouts (MBOs) and controlling shareholder transactions—law firm quality 
has the anticipated effect on the value of target shares. Upon filing of the case, our results 
suggest that there is a relative increase in target stock price when higher quality law firms 
are involved in the litigation. Alternatively, when no top quality law firms are present, but 
a lower quality firm is, the relative value of the target’s shares appears to decrease. We 
attribute these results to the market’s recognition of the possibility that the higher quality 
firms will be able to obtain a significant settlement for shareholders. Lesser quality firms 
 
company violated the federal securities laws.  
 11.  For example, the well-regarded law firms of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman, Grant & 
Eisenhofer and Labaton Sucharow all have practice groups in both the securities fraud and shareholder rights 
areas. Practice Areas, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP, 
http://www.blbglaw.com/practices/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015); Practice Areas, GRANT & 
EISENHOFER PA, http://www.gelaw.com/practice-areas (last visited Nov. 14, 2015); Practice Groups, LABATON 
SUCHAROW LLP, http://www.labaton.com/en/practiceareas/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 12.  See infra Part IV (discussing how data was gathered and summary statistics conducted). 
 13.  See The Basis for Inclusion, LEGAL 500, http://www.legal500.com/assets/pages/united-states/united-
states.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (noting the basis for inclusion). 
 14.  See Rodney Yap et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for Investors, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 16, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-investor-clients-
get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals.html (“Of 57 such investor class actions settled or otherwise concluded [in 
Delaware] in 2010 and 2011, 40—or 70[%]—made money for plaintiffs’ lawyers but not clients, according to 
data compiled by Bloomberg News.”). 
 15.  See infra Part IV (giving a hand-collected dataset comprising all 454 shareholder-derivative and class 
action lawsuits filed and a summary thereof). 
 16.  See supra text accompanying note 9 (discussing one example of a Delaware judge commenting on firm 
quality).  
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may be less able to win such settlements, which would explain the negative effect on target 
share price when they, but not top firms, are litigating cases. The effect of these firms on 
target share price may be limited to the threat that they can hold up a deal.17 Alternatively, 
the negative effect of filing by a low quality law firm may reflect the market’s 
“disappointment” that a deal with material flaws will not be targeted by a top law firm. 
Given that many lawsuits get filed shortly after the announcement of a merger, a fair 
concern about a study like ours is that the market is responding to an abundance of new 
information upon announcement of a merger. Although we control for deal premium and 
market timing, it may be difficult to tease out the segment of the market reaction that can 
be attributed solely to the quality of the plaintiff firm filing suit. To address this concern 
we run a robustness check that focuses on the subset of cases filed two or more days after 
announcement of the deal.18 Two days should be enough time for the market to react to the 
announcement of the deal. By examining firm filings more than two days after the deal, we 
can focus on market reactions that are more readily attributable to the plaintiff law firms 
alone. We find the same results as we do in the broader analysis: a relative price increase 
in the target’s stock when a higher quality firm files and a relative price decrease when 
lower quality firms, but not higher quality firms file. These results help confirm that law 
firm quality matters to market participants. 
We conduct several other robustness checks to provide additional confidence in our 
results. The most prominent of these checks is the inclusion of case data that extends 
through the end of 2009. We restrict our primary analysis to cases filed before the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which is the traditional demarcation 
point for the beginning of the financial crisis. The crisis had a profound effect on credit 
markets, causing them to come close to seizing. Deals depend dearly on the availability of 
credit and the scarcity of financing threatened the ability to close mergers and acquisitions. 
The uncertainty associated with deal closure likely altered the available cases and thus the 
strategies that law firms employed. For this reason, we view the post-crisis cases as 
different from the earlier sample. Nevertheless, when we include these cases in the 
analysis, our results largely remain the same. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the background law and theory 
surrounding merger litigation. Part III develops this theory into a series of hypotheses about 
the likely impact different litigation characteristics have on the stock price of targets. Part 
IV explains our data, variable construction, and provides basic descriptive statistics. Part 
V provides reports and discusses the results of event studies conducted upon the filing of 
merger lawsuits. Part VI concludes. 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery, In re Craftmade Int’l, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., (No. 6950-VCL), 2012 WL 1144734 (Del. Ch. 2012) (describing the court’s partial grant of 
plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin shareholder vote and subsequent delay of closing); see also Levi & Korsinsky LLP, 
Craftmade International, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6950-VCL (Del. Ch. 2011), http://www.zlk.com/success 
(scroll down to see case description) (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (“Won a hard-fought injunction requiring the 
company to issue numerous corrective disclosures and to publish a ‘Fort Howard’ press release, inviting potential 
bidders to make superior offers.” Neither an increase in the offer price nor damages were obtained in the case). 
 18.  Infra Table 6. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS LITIGATION 
A. Delaware Law Governing Mergers and Acquisitions 
Delaware law imposes several legal duties on boards of directors for public companies 
that are takeover targets. Ordinarily, board decisions are reviewed under the deferential 
business judgment rule.19 In the face of a cash-based, change-of-control acquisition, target 
boards must meet the Revlon standard requiring them to maximize the price for the target 
company’s shareholders.20 Additional protections exist for target shareholders in situations 
where the target board faces a conflict of interest, like an acquisition by a controlling 
shareholder.21 In a hostile bidder situation, boards face “enhanced scrutiny,” requiring that 
defensive measures must be instituted in response to a real threat to the target and must be 
proportional to the threat.22 Target shareholders have standing to bring private class or 
derivative actions to enforce these rights against recalcitrant boards or managers, and have 
recently done so with increasing frequency.23 These actions—and their recent 
proliferation—have become controversial in both the academic literature and the popular 
press. From one vantage point, such actions should reduce managerial agency costs—the 
costs generated by boards and managers acting in their own interests, rather than those of 
shareholders—by forcing boards and managers to act in the shareholders’ interests in the 
transactional context.24 From another, litigation to enforce these rights generates costs of 
its own, including the agency costs of plaintiffs’ lawyers themselves.25 Much of the 
academic debate over such litigation focuses on whether it reduces managerial agency costs 
and, even if it does, whether this benefit outweighs the litigation costs.26 
Delaware has attempted to respond to the agency cost concerns of transactional class 
 
 19.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the business 
judgment rule . . . ‘is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.’”) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 20.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 21.  See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“When directors of a Delaware 
corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the 
most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”). 
 22.  UNOCAL Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 23. See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting 
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 218 (1999) (discussing the increase in 
shareholder direct and class action suits). 
 24.  See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-
Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 143 (2004) (discussing how boards and managers become “more 
active watchdogs” following derivative litigation).  
 25.  See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) 
(attributing high agency costs in class action and derivative litigation primarily to the inability of the class to 
effectively monitor the attorneys).  
 26.  Compare Thompson & Thomas, supra note 24, at 207 (“[W]e conclude that the acquisition-oriented 
shareholder class actions filed in Delaware add value, even if they also have costs.”), with Daniel R. Fischel & 
Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 282 (1986) (concluding that derivative suits do not have a material 
impact on the firm’s managerial agency costs and its shareholders because of the insignificant magnitude of the 
shareholder’s wealth-effects). 
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actions by instituting procedures for selecting the class representative, or lead plaintiff, and 
the lead counsel. As is true for class actions generally, the interests of the lead plaintiff 
must align with those of the shareholder class in accordance with the typicality and 
adequacy requirements of Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.27 The Delaware Court of 
Chancery has established criteria for the selection of lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in 
addition to those set forth in Rule 23. In TCW Technology Limited Partnership v. 
Intermedia Communications, Inc., the court held that in making the lead plaintiff selection, 
it should consider the following factors: (1) “the quality of the pleading that appears best 
able to represent the interests of the shareholder class and derivative plaintiffs[;]”28 (2) 
which “shareholder plaintiff has the greatest economic stake in the outcome of the 
lawsuit[;]”29 and (3) “whether a particular litigant has prosecuted its lawsuit with greater 
energy, enthusiasm or vigor than have other similarly situated litigants.”30 The opinion 
noted that the second factor “is similar to the federal system that now uses a model whereby 
the class member with the largest economic interest in the action is given responsibility to 
control the litigation.”31 
In June 2002, the Delaware Court of Chancery settled on final criteria for lead plaintiff 
selection. In Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Service Company, LLC,32 the court held that it would 
consider the following factors: (1) the “quality of the pleading[;]” (2) “the relative 
economic stakes of the competing litigants . . . (to be accorded ‘great weight’)[;]” (3) “the 
willingness and ability of the contestants to litigate vigorously on behalf of an entire class 
of shareholders[;]” (4) “the absence of any conflict between larger, often institutional, 
shareholders and smaller shareholders[;]” (5) “the enthusiasm or vigor with which the 
various contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit[;]” and (6) “competence of counsel and 
their access to the resources necessary to prosecute the claims at issue.”33 
The theory behind TCW Technology and Hirt may be traced back to Elliot Weiss and 
John Beckerman’s Let the Money Do the Monitoring (Monitoring).34 In Monitoring, Weiss 
and Beckerman argued that by appointing institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in 
shareholder class actions, courts could reduce the agency costs of class action lawyers.35 
According to the theory asserted in Monitoring, institutional investors brought two 
strengths to the lead plaintiff role. First, they were motivated to monitor class counsel 
because they had “skin in the game.”36 Such funds had the proper incentives to police self-
serving behavior by plaintiff lawyers and assure that the case was being litigated skillfully 
 
 27.  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23. 
 28.  TCW Tech. Ltd P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 17, 2000). 
 29.  Id. at *4. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.; accord 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012). 
 32.  Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., LLC, No. CIV.A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 
9, 2002). 
 33.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 34.  See generally Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995) 
(discussing the benefits of appointing institutional investors as lead plaintiffs). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See id. at 2088–94 (discussing data on the stakes of institutional investors in recent shareholder 
litigation).  
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and in the interests of the class. Second, institutional investors were comparatively 
sophisticated, they served as fiduciaries, and they often had access to internal legal and 
financial expertise.37 They not only had the incentive to monitor class counsel, they had 
the skill to do so. Selection of institutional lead plaintiffs would mark a departure from the 
way lead plaintiffs were selected previously, which often created a “race to the courthouse” 
in which lead counsel obtained the position simply by being the first to file.38 The “race to 
the courthouse” incentivized plaintiffs’ lawyers to maintain stables of potential lead 
plaintiffs, almost always individuals rather than institutions, who could be quickly 
identified as potential lead plaintiffs in whose name a lawsuit could be rapidly filed.39 Such 
lead plaintiffs often had trivial stakes in the outcome of the case, and lacked sophistication, 
making them poorly qualified to monitor class counsel.40 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) preceded TCW 
Technologies and Hirt, and similarly created a preference for institutional investor lead 
plaintiffs in federal securities fraud class actions.41 The PSLRA triggered a competition 
between plaintiff law firms to obtain institutional investor clients, one that was enhanced 
by TCW Technologies and Hirt.42 The primary means of obtaining and retaining such 
clients is to offer portfolio monitoring services, by which plaintiff law firms directly 
monitor the portfolios of institutional clients for exposure to transactional cases.43 This 
enables the firms to identify institutional clients with a substantial enough stake in the 
transaction to obtain a lead plaintiff appointment in the litigation.44 Large institutional 
investors who are likely to be repeat players are highly prized as clients, and therefore are 
well-positioned to discriminate between firms, selecting the most skilled firms, with the 
most resources, to represent them in class actions.45 In contrast, firms that are unable to 
obtain institutional clients are poorly positioned to command a leading role in the most 
coveted cases. 
All is not lost for such firms. As described more fully throughout this Section, since 
TCW Technology and Hirt institutions have assumed a leading role in approximately 40% 
of all cases.46 Thus, even today, most suits proceed much as they did prior to TCW 
 
 37.  See id. at 2106 (discussing the benefits of an experienced institutional investor as a lead plaintiff 
opposed to an individual). 
 38.  Id. at 2062; see also Thompson & Thomas, supra note 24, at 136 (“By the early 1990s, plaintiffs’ law 
firms filing securities fraud class actions were accused of a whole host of dubious practices, including using 
professional plaintiffs in their cases, filing carbon copy complaints, and racing to the courthouse to be the first to 
file a case . . . .”). 
 39.  See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 34, at 2060–61 (discussing the practice of keeping a store of lead 
plaintiffs at the ready). 
 40.  See id. at 2060 (“In a large number of class actions, plaintiffs are poorly informed about the theories of 
their cases, are totally ignorant of the facts, or are illiterate concerning financial matters.”). 
 41.  See Michael A. Perino, Did the PSLRA Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 923 (2003) (discussing the 
lead plaintiff and notice provision of the PSLRA). 
 42.  Id. at 966. 
 43.  Webber, Private Policing, supra note 10, at 935. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Perino, supra note 41, at 924 n.61 (discussing selection of appropriate lead counsel by large institutional 
plaintiffs). 
 46.  See David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 157, 166, 167 nn.46–47 (2012) (“As predicted, institutional investors now lead over 40% of securities fraud 
class actions and around 40% of transactional class actions in Delaware.”). 
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Technologies and Hirt, with an individual lead plaintiff who lacks motivation (because of 
small stakes) and sophistication (because of lack of financial or legal training). Such lead 
plaintiffs are often selected by the lead counsel, rather than the other way around.47 They 
will rarely have the motivation or sophistication to monitor class counsel. Moreover, the 
law firms in such cases are either part of the group that has been passed over by institutional 
clients for portfolio monitoring, or among firms that may represent institutional investors 
but could not find an institutional client for the case. Because 60% of cases are still led by 
such firms, and monitored by individual clients with small stakes,48 we might expect such 
cases to result in worse outcomes for shareholders, either because the cases themselves are 
too weak to attract a quality firm or plaintiff, or because, even if the cases have merit, the 
class agents are unable to capitalize on it. 
Apart from the majority of cases that simply do not attract quality lead counsel and 
lead plaintiffs, law firms representing individual clients might still be able to maneuver 
their way into a case that has institutional lead plaintiffs who have selected quality 
counsel.49 Typically, this can be done by asking for a small share of the overall attorneys’ 
fee and doing little work in the case; attorneys with institutional clients might consent to 
such an arrangement for fear that the weaker firms might object to any settlement on behalf 
of their individual clients, or threaten to take the lead plaintiff/lead counsel dispute to the 
Delaware judges, who historically have expressed their antipathy to deciding such disputes 
(although recently they have become more amenable to judicial intervention).50 In 
addition, in exchange for a fee, smaller firms may side with one side or another in a fight 
between two law firm groups for the lead counsel role.51 
Thus, we might expect the agency costs of class action lawyers to be higher in cases 
with poor quality counsel and no institutional lead plaintiffs. One might also expect worse 
outcomes for shareholders, either because the cases brought by such lawyers are of poorer 
quality, because they are litigated poorly by less skilled counsel, or because they are 
litigated poorly by highly skilled counsel who invest less in the case because of the lack of 
an institutional lead plaintiff. And while the likelihood of such firms obtaining an 
improvement in price is virtually nonexistent, they may still introduce uncertainty into the 
deal process by obtaining a court order that delays the shareholder vote or by forcing the 
disclosure of negative information. In the worst case scenario, such cases might amount to 
little more than a strike suit, or a means of selling claim preclusion to defendants for a 
modest attorneys’ fee and no increase in target share price, i.e., no benefit to the target’s 
shareholders. And even in cases with top plaintiff counsel and institutional lead plaintiffs, 
we might still expect poor firms to have a deleterious effect, if for no other reason than 
dilution of the attorneys’ fee for the highly skilled counsel actually doing the bulk of the 
 
 47.  See Fred B. Burnside, “Go Pick A Client”–and Other Tales of Woe Resulting from the Selection of 
Class Counsel by Court-Ordered Competitive Bidding, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 363, 394–95 (2003) 
(discussing the importance of having a lead plaintiff). 
 48.  See Webber, supra note 46, at 166 (suggesting that if institutional investors lead approximately 40% of 
securities fraud cases, then individual investors would lead approximately 60% of such cases).  
 49.  See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 10, at 965 (discussing the dynamic between firms 
representing institutional investors and those representing small individual plaintiffs who are unlikely to be 
appointed as lead plaintiff). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Telephone Interview with Joel Friedlander, Partner, Friedlander and Gorris, P.A. (May 5, 2015). 
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work in the case. 
We might also expect the effects of law firm quality to be most prominent in cases 
where deals are vulnerable to conflicts of interest. Compared to third-party acquisitions, 
controlling shareholder transactions and MBOs raise concerns about conflicted fiduciaries 
acting in a self-interested fashion. Third-party acquirers do not have access to inside 
information in the way that controlling shareholders and managers do. Courts and markets 
rightly worry that insiders might exploit their access to information to favorably time an 
acquisition in the business cycle or to deprive minority shareholders of a firm-specific 
benefit, for example, the benefit of a promising new drug that is still in the research and 
development pipeline.52 Controlling shareholders—and managers—play a role in selecting 
the board of directors, who face conflicts in representing the interests of minority 
shareholders when the controllers or managers seek to acquire the company.53 
Consequently, the market may be more likely to scrutinize such transactions. The same is 
true for courts, though the legal regimes governing controlling shareholder transactions 
and MBOs differ somewhat. Controlling shareholder transactions face the heightened 
“entire fairness” review unless they meet certain procedural requirements, such as 
appointment of a special committee of independent directors and a non-coercive “majority 
of minority” provision.54 MBOs are not subjected to heightened “entire fairness” scrutiny 
so long as they comply with Delaware’s conflict of interest statute.55 Approval by 
independent directors or a minority of disinterested shareholders suffices to evade entire 
fairness review for MBOs.56 While both transaction types involve conflicts, their 
differential legal treatment could lead to different market reactions to the quality of firms 
in each case. Law firm quality ought to matter in both transaction types, but might matter 
more in MBOs, which can be more challenging to litigate than controlling shareholder 
transactions. In both cases, the potential for self-serving behavior by managers or 
controlling shareholders is great, and one might therefore expect litigation designed to 
thwart such behavior to have its most pronounced impact. 
B. Prior Research on M&A Litigation 
Most of the prior research on the utility of deal litigation has focused on the fact of 
the litigation itself, and not on the identity of the class’s agents. The clearest point of 
 
 52.  See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 9–10 (2005) (explaining how majority 
shareholders can take advantage of buyout options to relieve the corporation of being publically held); see also 
Matthew Cain & Steven Davidoff, Form over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-
outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 863 (2011) (stating that management’s position as an agent for shareholders enables 
them to manipulate the corporate process).  
 53.  See Subramanian, supra note 52, at 8–9 (explaining corporate structure in a mergers market). 
 54.  See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (2014) (holding that freeze-out mergers should 
be reviewed using the highly deferential business judgment standard).  
 55.  See Steven Davidoff, The Management Buyout Path of Least Resistance, DEALBOOK (June 12, 2013, 
1:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/the-management-buyout-path-of-less-resistance/?_r=0 
(suggesting that in a bid by David H. Murdock, chairman and chief executive of Dole Food, the business judgment 
rule would have been applied to the effort to take the company private had Mr. Murdock not also been a 
controlling stockholder). 
 56.  See In re Wheelabrator Tech. Inc. Sec. Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995) (noting that the 
burden of proof remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate the merger was unfair); see also Cain & Davidoff, supra 
note 52, at 863 (explaining how the board is easily swayed by managers to approve buy outs). 
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agreement between all of these studies is that the volume of such litigation has increased. 
Almost all transactions valued at more than $100 million in 2010 and 2011 were targeted 
by shareholder litigation.57 The vast majority of these lawsuits were “filed shortly after the 
deal’s announcement and often settled before the deal’s closing.”58 In 2005, roughly one-
third of mergers were subject to lawsuits, while roughly 92% of mergers were challenged 
in 2012.59 Few of these lawsuits resulted in tangible monetary benefits to shareholders; 
most settled for additional disclosures or, less frequently, changes to the terms of the deal.60 
Some studies on the utility of deal litigation conclude that it increases shareholder 
welfare, but others take a more skeptical view. Some research suggests that many of these 
cases result in additional disclosures about the merger to shareholders and a payment of 
relatively small fees to the plaintiffs’ lawyers.61 Some cases, however, result in substantial 
increases in the amount of consideration that the acquiring firm must pay the target to 
consummate the merger.62 Krishnan, Masulis, Thomas, and Thompson (KMTT) find that 
M&A subject to litigation were completed at a significantly lower rate than those not 
subject to litigation.63 They also found that M&A subject to shareholder litigation have 
significantly higher premiums in takeover deals.64 Most importantly, KMTT found that 
“the expected rise in the takeover premia [for cases subjected to shareholder litigation] 
more than offsets the fall in the probability of deal completion, resulting in a positive 
expected gain to target shareholders.”65 
Some prior research has focused on lead plaintiffs, rather than lead counsel. In the 
aftermath of TCW Technologies and Hirt, mutual funds and hedge funds remained largely 
quiescent and rarely participated as lead plaintiffs in these suits, much as they had before.66 
In contrast, public-pension funds and labor-union funds sharply increased their 
participation as lead plaintiffs in transactional class actions.67 
Unlike mutual funds and hedge funds, public pension funds and labor union funds 
 
 57.  See generally Cain & Davidoff, supra note 1 (recording that 84.7% of all transactions in 2010 
experienced litigation); DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that only five percent were not targeted 
in 2010 and 2011).  
 58.  DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 6, at 1. 
 59.  Cain & Davidoff, supra note 1, at 2. 
 60.  See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 6, at 11 (asserting that 83% of settlements in the study’s survey 
settled only for additional disclosures). 
 61.  See id. at 11–13 (comparing increased disclosure settlements and decreased plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees); 
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 1, at 3.  
 62.  An example is the Del Monte Foods buyout where the Court of Chancery initially awarded a preliminary 
injunction of the shareholder vote and the parties eventually agreed to an $89 million settlement. DAINES & 
KOUMRIAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
 63.  See C.N.V Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers & Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 
1250  tbl.2 (2012) [hereinafter Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation] (noting that the average takeover premium 
in the sample was 40.5%).  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 1250. 
 66.  See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 10, at 940–43 (noting that the economic free-rider problem 
has contributed to this decline).  
 67.  See id. at 932 (discussing the role of shareholders in litigant action); see also Adam B. Badawi, Merger 
Class Actions in Delaware and the Symptoms of Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 965, 992–
95 (2013) (noting the table that tracks the presence of institutional investors such as pension funds from 2004 to 
2011).  
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have no true competitors and, therefore, no concerns about free rider problems.68 They 
lack formal business relationships with corporate boards and management, nor, by and 
large, do public pension trustees travel in the same social circles as potential defendants.69 
Consequently, their participation in deal litigation is uninhibited by the types of business 
considerations that discourage the participation of other institutional types.70 Some of these 
funds have entered into portfolio monitoring arrangements with plaintiff law firms, which 
may explain their increased participation in these suits.71 The success of public pension 
participation may build on itself, leading to even greater participation by these funds.72 
Prior studies have found that public pension fund lead plaintiffs correlate with an increase 
from the offer to the final price, lower attorneys’ fees, and a higher equity price upon 
filing.73 These funds have similarly been found to correlate with higher recoveries and 
lower attorneys’ fees in federal 10b-5 securities fraud class actions.74 These studies broadly 
suggest that the basic intuition behind Monitoring may be sound, and that comparatively 
motivated and sophisticated lead plaintiffs pick better cases, better lawyers, and monitor 
those lawyers more carefully, or at least inspire those lawyers to work harder and accept 
lower fees when serving institutional clients that are large enough to be repeat players. 
In a contemporaneous paper, Krishnan, Davidoff, Solomon, and Thomas (KDST) also 
examine the effect of law firm quality in mergers and acquisitions litigation using a 
different methodological approach.75 Rather than conduct an event study examining the 
market reaction to the filing and consolidation of deal cases, KDST examined law firm 
effort (as measured by the number of docket entries and the quality of motion practice) and 
 
 68.  See, e.g., Webber, Private Policing, supra note 10, at 941 (“Individuals employed by a state by a state 
or local government entity, or in certain capacities by a private company, have their retirement saving 
automatically invested in the public-pension fund or labor-union fund associated with their employer. If a fund 
beneficiary is unhappy with the fund’s performance, the beneficiary’s only option is to change jobs, not move 
one’s retirement savings to a competitor.”). 
 69.  See id. at 942 (noting that while “mutual fund managers are more likely to travel in the same business, 
social, and educational circles as do corporate managers and directors,” the boards of trustees of pension funds 
are often composed of teachers, firefighters, and police officers).  
 70.  See id. at 943 (suggesting that “free-riding competitors, business conflicts, [and] social-network 
conflicts” deter mutual funds from pursuing lead plaintiff positions). 
 71.  See William B. Rubenstein, What We Now Know About How Lead Plaintiffs Select Lead Counsel (And 
Hence Who Gets Attorneys Fees!) In Securities Cases, 3 CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG. 219, 219 (2009) 
(“[S]ome plaintiffs firms have entered into arrangements whereby they monitor pension funds’ investments for 
irregularities and suggest possible grounds for litigation.”). 
 72.  See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 10, at 937 (“[T]hese funds’ successful record as lead plaintiffs 
in these suits may encourage them to bring more of them.”). 
 73.  See id. (“[P]ublic-pension funds are the only institutions that statistically significantly correlate with 
the outcomes of utmost interest to shareholders—an increase from the offer price to the final price, and lower 
attorneys’ fees.”). 
 74.  See C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 
356, 357–58 (2010) (noting that institutions as lead plaintiffs are more effective than individuals); Michael Perino, 
Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in 
Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 369–70 (2012) (noting that attorney fees are 
significantly lower when there is a public pension lead plaintiff). 
 75.  C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Who are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in 
Merger Litigation 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 265/2014, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490098 [hereinafter Krishnan et al., Who are Top Law 
Firms?]. 
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case outcomes (like the rate of dismissal or whether the case settled for consideration).76 
They conclude that the quality of the plaintiff law firm correlates with case outcomes, and 
that law firm skill explains the correlation.77 They conclude, as do we, that top plaintiff 
law firms target conflicted transactions like MBOs.78 We believe that our Article’s focus 
on differences in case selection and KDST’s detailed analysis of variation in litigation skills 
mutually reinforce the conclusion that law firm quality matters in deal litigation. 
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The impact of merger litigation on firm value depends, at least in part, on the potential 
outcomes associated with that litigation. Those outcomes can vary widely. Most 
commonly, the parties reach a settlement that involves changes to the shareholder 
disclosures without an increase in the merger consideration.79 Less common, but not rare, 
are cases where the settlement includes amendments to the merger agreement without an 
increase in consideration.80 These amendments typically reduce the number or strength of 
the deal protection devices in the merger agreement. In theory, these changes could induce 
another bidder who will pay a higher price, although existing research suggests that this 
does not occur very often.81 In still more rare cases, the settlement can provide for an 
increase in merger consideration, which is likely to be the most favorable outcome for 
shareholders.82 As a general matter, award of attorneys’ fees increase as benefits to 
shareholders increase.83 Put another way, obtaining an increase in consideration is likely 
to result in a larger fee award than a disclosure-only settlement. 
These different outcomes should have different effects on firm value. To the degree 
that these results can be predicted before they occur, the target’s stock price should reflect 
these expectations. If the market can observe some potential for an increase in 
consideration upon filing of the suit, all other things being equal, the stock price should 
rise. Alternatively, if the market is aware that a disclosure-only settlement is in the offing, 
such disclosure should have a negative effect on firm value. This effect could arise for 
several reasons: (1) because disclosure settlements do not provide any more additional 
information and result only in the payment of the attorneys’ fee award; (2) because such 
suits could result in delay of the merger or judicial criticism of the deal; or (3) because the 
disclosed information—if meaningful—would be expected to be negative because, if it 
were positive, the parties would have already disclosed it. That negative information could 
imperil the merger vote and this lack of deal certainty should result in a negative price. 
 
 76.  Id. at 4. 
 77.  Id. (“We find that the top . . . plaintiffs’ law firms more actively litigate their cases than other law firms, 
filing more documents with the court as shown by the number of entries on the case docket sheets and bring 
significantly more motions for an injunction to stop transactions.”). 
 78.  Id. at 3 (“We find that . . . top firms tend to pursue transactions that exhibit indicia of greater potential 
conflicts of interest, such as [MBOs] . . . .”). 
 79.  Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis 
and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 557 (2015). 
 80.  See id. at 560 (explaining the three basic types of merger litigation). 
 81.  See id. at 570 (“Amendment settlements may benefit the shareholders by increasing the likelihood that 
a third party will make a topping bid.”). 
 82.  Id. at 560. 
 83.  Id. at 566 n.42, 567. 
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Alternatively, the market may identify flaws with the merger but react negatively upon the 
filing of a suit by a poor quality firm that would be incapable of capitalizing on those flaws 
to improve price. 
A key question for our analysis is whether we can control for variables that indicate 
the likelihood of these outcomes. Some of the underlying facts of the case should account 
for some of this variation. For example, imagine a lawsuit that challenges an attempted 
hostile takeover. When the market initially learns of interest from the hostile bidder, the 
price of the potential target may rise to reflect the possibility of a deal.84 The market may 
expect that the initially hostile interest will turn friendly. The company’s reaction to a 
lawsuit that aims to remove defensive measures may signal that there is even more 
resistance to the deal than initially perceived. As a consequence, the value of the potential 
target may drop to reflect the decrease in deal certainty. MBOs may offer a 
counterexample. When a group of insiders bargains to buy the company, the self-dealing 
concerns are evident.85 The filing of a lawsuit to challenge the transaction may signal that 
a substantial settlement is likely and the share price may increase accordingly. 
We expect that the identity of the plaintiffs’ law firm will also have an effect on how 
litigation affects the value of the target’s shares.86 That effect should reflect the quality of 
the law firm filing the case and beliefs about how that firm decides whether to file a 
complaint. That decision is likely to be an expected value calculation that pits the expected 
recovery against the costs of bringing the case. The expected recovery should turn, at least 
in part, on the specific facts of the case and the identity of the other law firms (and their 
clients) that have or are likely to file a complaint. This latter factor should matter because 
it will affect the likelihood of being named as lead counsel in the case. As a general matter, 
the lead counsel will receive a larger share than the other law firms that have filed a 
complaint.87 While the assignment of lead counsel typically results from a private bargain 
among the parties that have filed a complaint, that bargain occurs in the shadow of 
Delaware’s selection criteria.88 Those firms with large, institutional clients and with strong 
reputations will usually be designated lead counsel through these agreements because that 
is the likely outcome if the lead counsel dispute spilled into court. 
Law firms with strong reputations may avoid filing in weaker cases because filing 
them may harm their reputations or because recoveries in these cases are likely to be small. 
 
 84.  See Dale A. Oesterle, Delaware’s Takeover Statute of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced, 13 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 897 n.79 (1988) (“In hostile takeovers, stock price gains provide the market's estimate of 
the increase in returns likely to result from takeover activity, and empirical evidence gathered on the question 
suggests that takeovers produce huge gains to target shareholders and marginal or, in the 1980’s, insignificant 
gains to the shareholders of acquirors.”). 
 85.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 769, 819 (2006) (“While management is acting as the sellers’ agents and, in that capacity, is obliged to get the 
best price it can for the shareholders, it is also acting as a purchaser and, in that capacity, has a strong self-interest 
to pay the lowest possible price.”). 
 86.  See Krishnan et al., Who are the Top Law Firms?, supra note 75, at 6 (finding that law firm quality 
correlates with case outcomes). 
 87.  See Jessica Erickson, The Market for Leadership in Corporate Litigation, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 1479, 1513 
(forthcoming 2015) (discussing how in winner-take-all systems established law firms are favored); Elliott J. Weiss 
& Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1806 (2004) (discussing how Delaware law allows attorneys to behave opportunistically 
and that courts do not adequately protect shareholders or corporations from the litigation costs). 
 88.  See supra Section II.A (for a review of those criteria). 
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Law firms are particularly sensitive to reputational effects in Delaware, which is the site of 
a high percentage of this litigation.89 Delaware has a comparatively small bar and just five 
judges who hear these cases at the trial level.90 Those law firms who already have low 
quality reputations may have less to lose in this regard. Accordingly, the potential of being 
named as lead counsel may make some of these cases enticing for them.91 It is not clear, 
however, that the lower quality firms will confine themselves to lower quality cases. As 
discussed in Section II.A, even though these firms will face long odds of being named lead 
counsel in high quality cases, they may be able to bargain for a small share of fees.92 Their 
allocation of complaints between high quality and low quality cases should depend on the 
different expected rewards that these cases bring. 
The complexity of the filing decision leads us to question the common perception that 
those law firms that file the most cases are of low quality. That result is certainly possible, 
but the dynamics of filing do not lead inexorably to that conclusion. For example, if there 
are a large number of high quality cases, one may observe the high quality law firms filing 
cases quite frequently. Alternatively, if there are only a small number of cases that are 
promising, one might expect the lower quality law firms to file more often. The number of 
cases filed to challenge mergers may also depend on the other opportunities that are 
available to law firms. Some scholars have suggested that the increase in merger litigation 
is a consequence of opportunities drying up elsewhere, such as securities law.93 To the 
degree that filing decisions depend on other expertise that the law firm has and the 
opportunity costs of filing those other cases, it is even more difficult to draw inferences 
from the number of cases filed. 
We expect the quality of the law firms filing cases to be reflected in firm value (i.e., 
to be captured in an event study). If there is a possibility that the case will result in an 
increase in merger consideration from the buyer to the target, that should increase share 
value of the target.94 Note, however, that the impact need not be uniformly positive. Better 
law firms may be better able to halt a deal altogether. This possibility could lead to a 
negative effect on share price because it threatens deal certainty. But top firms derive no 
benefit from halting a deal. Their optimal outcome is for deals to close with a bump in price 
because such outcomes secure the highest available legal fees. And while it may be true 
that top firms secure some negotiating leverage in the next case by occasionally halting a 
deal in the current case, these firms won’t remain profitable for very long if they litigate 
cases for which they recoup no costs and collect little or no fee because they have thwarted 
too many deals. Accordingly, we expect a positive effect associated with the involvement 
of a top firm. The pecuniary benefit of such a firm, or at least its potential to identify a 
 
 89.  DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 6, at 1. 
 90.  The Delaware Chancery Court has one Chancellor and four Vice Chancellors. Judicial Officers of the 
Court of Chancery, DEL. ST. CTS., http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.stm (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).  
 91.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text (stating that “the lead counsel will receive a larger share than 
the other law firms that have filed a complaint”). 
 92.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing that attorneys may ask “for a small share of the 
overall attorney’s fee and do little work in the case”). 
 93.  Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 431 (2012). 
 94.  Cf. Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. REG. 119, 
122 (“One important, and undisputed, datum about acquisitive transactions should be noted from the outset: 
acquisitions generate substantial gains to target company shareholders.”). 
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legally vulnerable case that is susceptible to a bump in price, outweighs any increased 
likelihood that the firm will thwart the deal.95 
When it comes to lower quality firms, however, we have different expectations. 
Specifically, when these firms are present, but the higher quality firms are not, we expect 
a uniformly negative effect on target share price. The presence of these lower quality firms 
may decrease deal certainty because the existence of the lawsuit creates a holdup threat. It 
may also signal to the market that the case is not meritorious or that a meritorious case will 
not be competently litigated. For these reasons, we expect a negative effect associated with 
the involvement of these firms. 
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
We begin with a hand-collected dataset comprising all 454 shareholder-derivative and 
class action lawsuits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery from November 1, 2003 to 
December 31, 2009. We obtain this data directly from Lexis-Nexis File and Serve, which 
is utilized by the Delaware Court of Chancery as its electronic filing system.96 We began 
collecting data from November 2003 because that is when the Court of Chancery first 
instituted use of this system.97 We searched all cases from this time period using the Clerk 
of the Court’s own search field category for “derivative and class actions.” Of these 454 
cases, we identified 290 (64%) as class or derivative actions brought in M&A cases; of 
these, we identified 224 cases which took place prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008. We analyze cases from November 2003 through September 2008 to 
examine deal litigation prior to the distortions introduced by the financial crisis. Of those 
cases, we keep only those for which we have sufficient trading data, via Eventus, to conduct 
our event study. We also eliminate those cases where the premium is negative and where 
the plaintiffs filed the first lawsuit more than 365 days after the announcement of the 
merger. That leaves the sample with a total of 125 filed cases with all relevant variables. 
Most of the variables are straightforward. For the timing and premium variables, we 
augment data from the dockets with news reports about each transaction. This information 
allows us to construct separate indicator variables that signify whether: (1) the plaintiffs 
filed the first lawsuit challenging the merger on the same day as the announcement of the 
transaction, and (2) whether the plaintiffs filed the first lawsuit challenging the merger on 
the first trading day after the announcement of the transaction.98 The premium variable 
reflects the percentage difference between the market price on the day prior to the merger 
announcement and the deal price. We count the number of plaintiffs’ law firms by 
examining the complaints and the dockets. For the case type variables, we examine the 
complaints and news reports. If either of those sources allege that the transaction involves 
a management buyout or an acquisition by a controlling shareholder, we code the case 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation, supra note 63 (discussing how M&A subject to 
litigation were not completed as often as those not subject to litigation). 
 96. See Electronic Filing in the Delaware Judiciary, JUD. BRANCH ST. DEL., 
http://courts.delaware.gov/efiling/index.stm (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 97.  See id. (“Commencing October 20, 2003, every Civil Action in the Court of Chancery, whether already 
pending or newly filed, shall be subject to electronic filing or eFiling.”). 
 98.  We include this variable because, if the announcement occurred after the close of trading, the first 
trading day after the announcement would be the market’s first opportunity to react to that information. 
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accordingly. We code cases that qualify as both a management buyout and a controlling 
shareholder transaction as MBOs. 
The law firm variables require more explanation. As an initial matter, we review the 
complaints to ascertain which law firms have filed a complaint in a case. For these 
purposes, we ignore law firms that are usually acting as Delaware counsel for out of state 
plaintiffs. These firms include Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. and Chimicles & 
Tikellis, LLP.99 These firms occasionally do the work of representing plaintiffs, but it is 
usually not evident from the complaints when that is the case. For this reason, we choose 
to omit these firms from our analysis.100 For all other firms, we note when they file a 
complaint in a case and use those data for our law firm categorizations. 
Any grouping of law firms by quality is bound to be controversial. We recognize that 
reality and, to the degree possible, we base these categorizations on observations and 
studies from external sources. We rely on two rankings for firms on the top end of the 
spectrum. The first is the Legal 500’s ranking of law firms in the area of M&A litigation. 
The Legal 500 bases its rankings on publicly available information and on private 
information from the law firms themselves.101 The M&A litigation rankings include both 
plaintiff-side and defense-side firms. Given our focus on the former, we categorize any 
plaintiff-side firm that appears in our dataset in our top law firm category. 
While helpful, the Legal 500 rankings do suffer from the fact that they are not 
contemporaneous with our sample window (2003–2008). For this reason, we augment 
those rankings with those of SCAS during the relevant time frame.102 For each of the years 
in our sample window, we note whether a law firm with a merger practice appeared in the 
top ten of SCAS’s rankings for any year in our sample window. Those rankings turn on the 
overall value of the securities settlements obtained by the firm in that year. While this 
metric is not a direct measure of quality, we believe it is fair to infer that the best firms are 
likely to be able to recruit the best clients, which should lead to higher settlements. The 
obvious issue with these rankings is that they are for securities claims rather than merger 
challenges. Many of these firms are, however, quite active in both areas.103 To the degree 
that law firm quality spills over different practice areas, the SCAS rankings should provide 
some measure of ability in merger litigation. 
When it comes to the other end of the spectrum, there are no rankings to consult. There 
are, however, some metrics of quality. One is the amount of legal fees awarded in merger 
settlements. The Chancellor and Vice Chancellors factor attorney quality into their 
determinations of legal fee awards. A 2012 report by Ann Woolner, Phil Milford, and 
Rodney Yap of Bloomberg News compiled data on law firms that had leading roles in 
Delaware merger cases in five or more cases that were settled and completed in either 2010 
 
 99.  Cheffins, supra note 93, at 480. 
 100.  These firms appear in such a high proportion of our cases that it would muddy the analysis to include 
them. 
 101.  See The Basis for Inclusion, supra note 13 (explaining the Legal 500 criteria). 
 102.  Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a company specializing in corporate governance, releases 
the SCAS 50, which lists the top 50 plaintiffs’ law firms by the total dollar amount of final securities class action 
settlements. Peter Lattman, The SCAS 50: Which Plaintiffs’ Firms Hit It Big in 2006, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 8, 
2007, 4:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/03/08/the-scas-50-who-hit-it-big-in-2006/.  
 103.  See supra note 11 (listing firms active in securities and mergers).  
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or 2011.104 This compilation includes information on the aggregate legal fees awarded to 
these firms in these cases.105 These firms differ dramatically in the fees they received. The 
top three firms—Grant & Eisenhoffer, Bernstein Litowitz, and Robbins Geller—earned, 
on average, $6.1 million in fees per case.106 All three of these firms qualify as top firms 
using the measures outlined above. The bottom three firms—Faruqi & Faruqi, Levi & 
Korsinsky, and Rosenthal Monhait—earned, on average $670,000 in fees per case.107 
To supplement this categorization we also rely on the qualitative assessments made 
by Delaware judges. Vice Chancellor Laster has perhaps been most vocal in this regard. In 
his widely noted opinion in In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,108 he replaced the 
lead counsel on the basis of their deficiencies in litigating the case and their lack of candor 
in justifying their positions.109 In the course of doing so, he shared his impressions of the 
law firms involved in the case. He noted that a number of firms have a practice of filing 
merger cases frequently and settling them early.110 The firms he singled out for frequently 
filing cookie cutter complaints included: Wolf Popper, LLP, Wolf Haldenstein Adler 
Freeman Herz, LLP, and Abbey Spanier Rodd & Abrams, LLP.111 
This is not the only occasion when Vice Chancellor Laster has criticized law firms for 
their perceived lack of diligence in litigating their claims. In resolving a leadership dispute 
pre-trial in In re Compellant Technologies, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,112 he shared his 
views on the past work of several firms. He stated, when determining lead counsel, “the 
key factor for me . . . is what your track record is generating tangible benefits for 
stockholders.”113 He praised Abraham, Fruchter & Twersky, LLP and Labaton Sucharow 
LLP for the results they have achieved in past cases.114 But he noted that Faruqi & Faruqi 
had not identified a single case where they had produced those tangible results. As he put 
it, “it’s a big hole in your firm resume.”115 
While Vice Chancellor Laster may be the most vocal about law firm quality, he is not 
alone. In In re SS&C Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,116 Vice Chancellor Lamb 
 
 104.  Rodney Yap et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for Investors, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
16, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-investor-clients-get-
nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals.html. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. One of the authors of this Article, David Webber, was formerly employed by Bernstein Litowitz. 
He has no current relationship with the firm. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 109.  Id. at 957 (“I conclude that Old Counsel has not provided adequate representation. This conclusion 
provides a sufficient grounding to replace Old Counsel.”). 
 110.  See id. at 959–60 (suggesting that this pattern creates a “system involves little real litigation activity, 
generates questionable benefits for class members, provides transaction-wide releases for defendants, and offers 
a good living for the traditional plaintiffs bar”). Vice Chancellor Laster noted that the early settling activity leads 
“some wags in the defense bar to label [these firms] ‘Pilgrims.’” Id. at 945. 
 111.  See id. at 943–45 (describing the factual background and complaints filed in this case). 
 112.  In re Compellant Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
9, 2011). 
 113.  Transcript of Motion to Consolidate and Organize Council and the Court’s Ruling at 6:3–6, In re 
Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., (No. 6094-VCL), 2014 WL 6382523 (Del. Ch. Jan 13, 2011). 
 114.  Id. at 6:17–20. 
 115.  Id. at 6:20–21. 
 116.  In re SS&C Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 948 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Del. Ch. 2008).  
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considered a motion to impose sanctions on The Brualdi Law Firm.117 The motion 
involved allegations that the firm had potential improper relationships with investment 
partnerships operated by the representative plaintiffs. When there was a possibility that the 
nature of those relationships would become public, the firm filed a motion to withdraw in 
what the court determined to be bad faith.118 Vice Chancellor Lamb imposed the requested 
sanctions and, in the course of doing so, noted that the Brualdi firm’s actions “demonstrate 
a pattern of, at best, carelessness, and, at worst, a deliberate effort to mislead the court.”119 
We define any firm in our sample that appears in the bottom three of the Bloomberg 
attorney fee rankings or has been criticized by Vice Chancellor Laster or Vice Chancellor 
Lamb as a low quality firm.120 Table 1 summarizes our categorization of higher quality 
and lesser quality firms and the basis for each categorization. From these categories we 
create variables for cases that involve high quality firms and cases that involve no higher 
quality firms but do involve lower quality firms. Top firms almost always serve as lead 
counsel, make most or all of the litigation decisions, and collect most of the fees.121 
Therefore, our high quality firm measure includes cases that have both high quality and 
low quality firms because those cases are driven by the high quality firms. The omitted 
category for the law firm quality variables includes cases involving all unclassified firms—
which we largely consider to be the “middle” quality tier. 
 












We provide simple descriptive statistics in Table 2. We briefly highlight a few of those 
numbers to provide an overview of the dataset. As one might expect, plaintiffs can be 
extremely quick to file. About one-third of merger challenges have the first complaint filed 
on the day of the announcement or on the day after the announcement. While this is a 
substantial percentage of cases, a majority of suits in our sample are filed more than two 
days after announcement of the transaction. This suggests that something other than the 
“race to the courthouse” drives filing in Delaware, and with good reason, since Delaware 
 
 117.  Id. at 1141 (“The court considers a motion to impose sanctions on the plaintiffs and their counsel [The 
Brualdi Firm].”).  
 118.  Id. at 1143–44. 
 119.  Id. at 1151. 
 120.  The bottom three in the Bloomberg study includes Rosenthal & Monhait.  
 121.  Jessica Erickson, The Market for Leadership in Corporate Litigation, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1479, 1482 
(2015) (“In . . . behind-the-scenes negotiations, [lawyers] are forced to agree to complicated leadership structures 
that divide governance responsibilities among a surprisingly high number of legal actors.”).  
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abandoned “race to the courthouse” in TCW Technologies and Hirt.122 Finally, we note 
that a fairly large number of cases involve the types of transactions where self-dealing is 
likely to be a concern. Around 14% of the cases involve MBOs and about 23% involve 
controlling shareholder transactions. 
 















Table 3 provides the simple correlations for the primary variables. Several of these 
correlations are of note. Given the concern about the filing of cookie cutter complaints in 
merger cases, one might think that lesser quality firms are more likely to file cases more 
quickly. If these are the firms that produce these sorts of complaints, they should be able 
to produce them quickly and get them before the court in short order. However, the higher 
quality firms are more likely to be involved in the more quickly filed cases. The simple 
correlation between the same day filing and the presence of a top firm is .212 and the 
correlation for next day filing and the presence of a top firm is .190. While our data does 
not allow us to confirm that it is the top firms that are, in fact, filing first, the data is 
consistent with that possibility. In the cases where top firms do not file, the lesser quality 
firms appear to be slow to file. The correlations with the presence of lesser quality firms, 
but no top firms, are negative for both same day filing and next day filing. This evidence 
suggests that poor quality firms may wait to see what other firms file in Delaware before 
making a decision on how to proceed. If a top firm files first, poor quality firms may 
attempt to maneuver their way onto the lead counsel team in Delaware in the hopes of 









 122.  See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (describing why Delaware got rid of the “race to the 
courthouse”).  
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V. EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS 
A. Event Study Methodology 
We use standard event study methodology to analyze the effect of Delaware litigation 
on equity prices.123 This approach assumes that stock returns follow a market model, rt = 
 + rtm + t, where: rt is the return on a particular stock at time t; rtm is the compounded 
return on a market portfolio; and t is a stochastic error. If an event, such as a lawsuit filing, 
occurs on day T, then there may be an “abnormal return” to the particular stock on that day. 
This can be captured by first calculating the predicted return, which we call r*t, using the 
constant and coefficient calculated in the market model equation. To calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return for firm i we subtract the actual cumulative return during the 
event window from the predicted return during that window: CARi = rt - r*t. We use event 
periods of varying lengths, as detailed below, and a 255-day, pre-event window consisting 
of T-300 to T-45. 
We perform a number of regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return as the 
dependent variable and various lawsuit and firm characteristics as the independent 
variables. We use weighted least squares (WLS) to estimate these regressions, which helps 
to correct for heteroskedasticity.124 For weights, we use the inverse of the variance of the 
predicted residual in the market model.125 
 
 123.  “Event studies are among the most successful uses of econometrics in policy analysis.” Sanjai Bhagat 
& Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law--Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation 1 (John M Olin Ctr. 
For Studies in Law, Econ., and Pub. Policy, Paper No. 259, 2001), 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=lepp_papers.  
 124.  For other papers that use this WLS technique see e.g., Husayn Shahur, Industry Structure and 
Horizontal Takeovers: Analysis of Wealth Effects on Rivals, Suppliers, and Corporate Customers, 76 J. FIN. 
ECON. 61 (2005); Marie Dutordoir & Linda Van de Gucht, Are There Windows of Opportunity for Corporate 
Debt Issuance? Evidence for Western Europe, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 2828 (2007). 
 125.  Our results are largely unchanged when we conduct unweighted OLS regressions, although some of the 
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B. Results 
1. Primary Analysis 
This Section presents the results of event studies conducted at the time of filing the 
lawsuit. For each of these events, we regress the estimated cumulative abnormal return for 
each firm for different event windows against the case characteristics that we expect to 
matter. We begin with a basic model and then introduce case controls to see how that 
affects the coefficients. Tables 4 through 8 report the returns to case filing for the [0, +1] 
and [0, +2] windows, i.e. the cumulative return for the day of the event and the following 
day and the day of the event and the following two days, respectively.126 
As suggested earlier, many merger lawsuits get filed shortly after the announcement 
of the transaction.127 We want to isolate the stock price effect that can be attributed to the 
lawsuit and, for this reason, we try to control for any stock price effects that can be 
attributed to the fact of the transaction. We use two interaction variables to control for this 
effect. The first interacts the deal premium128 with an indicator for the first case being filed 
on the day of the announcement. The second interacts the deal premium with an indicator 
for the first case being filed on the day after the announcement. The following example 
illustrates why it is important to control for the deal premium. Company XYZ’s stock is 
trading at $25 per share on the New York Stock Exchange. ABC is interested in acquiring 
XYZ. It offers a traditional premium of 20% over the current trading price of XYZ.
129
 
ABC therefore offers $30 per share for XYZ’s stock trading at $25 per share. The 
immediate market reaction will be to bid up the price of XYZ to somewhere close to, but 
still less than, the full $30 per share offered by ABC. Many investors are happy to sell their 
shares for $29 per share, locking in their gains. On the other hand, merger arbitrageurs will 
purchase the stock, acquiring many shares at $29 per share, betting that the deal will close 
and that they will reap profits of $1 per share. These arbitrageurs assume the risk that the 
deal will not in fact close and that the shares they purchased for $29 may plummet in value. 
Because arbitrageurs move into the stock shortly after the deal is announced, the stock 
price will react immediately, and therefore, the price will go up immediately. If the first 
case is filed on the same day the deal is announced, or the day after the deal is announced, 
then the market is still reacting to the announced premium, and that increase cannot be 
attributed solely to a law firm effect. We therefore expect the coefficients on variables 
relating deal premium with suits filed the day of or the day after the announcement of the 
deal to be large, positive, and highly statistically significant because the stock price is likely 
to reflect the deal price minus some discount for the potential that the deal will not close. 
 
standard errors are larger for some of the coefficients of interest. 
 126.  Infra Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. While event studies sometimes use the [-1,+1] window, we are wary of 
doing so in this study. Many of the lawsuits get filed the day of or the day after the announcement of the deal. 
One of our chief concerns is that the market activity associated with the deal may affect target prices in ways that 
we cannot completely control for. To limit this potential we both control for the deal premium and limit the 
beginning of the abnormal return window to the day the plaintiffs file the complaint. 
 127.  See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 6, at 1. 
 128.  The deal premium is that amount by which the acquirer’s offer for the target’s stock exceeds the current 
trading price of the target’s stock. If the target’s stock price is currently $25 per share, and the acquirer offers $30 
per share, then the premium is 20%. 
 129.  In our sample, the mean premium is 19%. Supra Table 1. 
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Unsurprisingly, that is exactly what we find. The coefficients for these variables are large, 
positive, and highly statistically significant across all the case filing regressions that we 
report. 
Table 4130 reports the regressions for high quality law firms and cumulative abnormal 
returns. We report results for two cumulative abnormal return windows ([0, +1] and [0, 
+2]), and we run both specifications with and without yearly fixed effects. Our hypothesis 
is that law firm quality is most likely to matter in the cases where potential conflicts make 
the deal vulnerable, such as MBOs and controlling shareholder transactions.131 
Discussions by the authors with merger arbitrageurs confirm that interested market 
participants pay attention to litigation when it involves these kinds of cases. For this reason, 
we are most concerned with the quality of law firms in those cases. To isolate this effect 
we interact our law firm variables with case type indicators. In Table 4, we do this for top 
firms and both controlling shareholders and MBOs. We find that the variables for the 
interaction between top firms and MBOs are large, positive, and statistically significant at 
the 5% level in all specifications. For controlling shareholder cases, the top firm interaction 
variable is large, positive, and statistically significant at the 5% level in three of the four 
regressions. Restated, there is evidence of a large and positive market reaction to the filing 
of suit by a top law firm in an MBO and to the filing of suit by a top law firm in a controlling 
shareholder transaction. This result confirms our hypothesis that top firms should correlate 
with returns in conflicted, legally vulnerable deals. The positive market reaction to top 
firms in both MBOs and controlling shareholder transactions suggests that the pecuniary 
















 130.  This table presents results from OLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return as the 
dependent variable. The cumulative abnormal return covers the windows indicated in the tables. Day zero is the 
day the first complaint is filed against the target firm. Some variables, including the deal premium, indicator 
variables for whether the case was filed on the same day as the announcement, and fixed effects for year, have 
been omitted for brevity. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of 
the cumulative abnormal return. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
 131.  See Krishnan et al., Who are Top Law Firms?, supra note 75, at 10–12 (discussing the types of deals 
top plaintiffs’ law firms are associated with). 
 132.  There is some risk that plaintiffs’ law firms could scuttle the deal entirely by exposing its flaws through 
litigation. 
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In contrast, lower quality firms should have a more uniformly negative effect on stock 
price. These firms should be able to impact deal certainty because filing a suit creates some 
ability to hold up the transaction until the parties reach a settlement, or because such firms 
will be unable or unwilling to obtain a positive litigation outcome. If these firms are unable 
to produce benefits for shareholders—such as an increase in deal consideration—one 
should expect the stock price to reflect the risk that the lawsuit will delay the deal without 
an expectation of any benefits. Alternatively, deal characteristics may lead the market to 
expect an above-average result, only to have such expectations dashed when a lesser 
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quality firm brings suit.133 Table 5134 presents the results for lesser quality firms. Our 
primary variable of interest, NoTop, indicates when no higher quality firm is involved, but 
those of lesser quality have filed a complaint. 
 




























 133.  See, e.g., Lance Duroni, Plaintiff Blasts Settlement of Suit Over Rural/Metro Deal, LAW360 (Jan. 6, 
2012, 6:40 PM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/298164/plaintiff-blasts-settlement-of-suit-over-rural-
metro-deal (reporting a lawsuit by a class action lead plaintiff against a class lead counsel because lead counsel 
Faruqi & Faruqi failed to pursue valuable claims and instead sought to settle for disclosures and attorneys’ fees). 
Subsequent to this suit, this case ultimately resulted in a plaintiff’s verdict at trial, in which Vice Chancellor Laster 
awarded $91 million in damages to the plaintiffs. See Brandon Lowrey, RBC Hit With $76 Million Judgment Over 
Botched Rural/Metro Sale, LAW360 (Oct. 10, 2014, 5:51 PM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/586598/rbc-
hit-with-76m-judgment-over-botched-rural-metro-sale (reporting Vice Chancellor Laster’s $91.3 million 
damages award, with 83% attributable to RBC). 
 134.  This table presents results from OLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return as the 
dependent variable. The cumulative abnormal return covers the windows indicated in the tables. Day zero is the 
day the first complaint is filed against the target firm. Some variables, including the deal premium, indicator 
variables for whether the case was filed on the same day as the announcement, and fixed effects for year, have 
been omitted for brevity. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of 
the cumulative abnormal return. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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The results of the regressions are broadly consistent with our expectations. The 
interaction terms for the presence of lower quality firms and no top firms, and MBO cases, 
is negative, but not significant. We also find that lower quality firms, when interacted with 
controlling shareholders, yield large, negative, and statistically significant results. This 
provides some evidence for our hypothesis that low quality firms should negatively 
correlate with returns. We view the combination of results in Tables 3 and 4 as suggestive 
evidence that law firm quality matters in conflicted transactions.135 
We note that with regard to Tables 4 and 5 it is possible that our results understate the 
actual market reaction to filings by top law firms. As noted in Table 1, top firms correlate 
with quick filing that is, with filing on the day of or the day after the deal is announced. 
Still, it remains possible that top firms may file suit after our one and two day windows 
have closed. Consequently, in some instances, the market reaction for “top firms” will 
understate what the market reaction likely would have been had the market actually 
observed the top firm filing within the window. As a result, our results likely understate 
the effect we describe. 
Though it is not our primary variable of interest, it is worth discussing the number of 
plaintiffs’ law firms involved in each case. The coefficient for this variable is very slightly 
positive and statistically significant in almost all specifications in Tables 5 and 6. There 
are two ways of interpreting this result. First, one might infer that the number of law firms 
signals the quality of the case. If high quality cases are likely to result in an increase in 
consideration, then they are also likely to attract more plaintiff law firms eager to collect 
the attorneys’ fees associated with price improvements. That could account for the relative 
increase in stock price associated with the involvement of each additional law firm.136 A 
second interpretation is that the incentive to free ride on the effort of other firms increases 
as more plaintiffs firms file complaints in a case. In the context of merger litigation, this 
incentive may arise because any firm’s share of a settlement is likely to decrease as more 
law firms become involved.137 This dynamic could make settlement more likely because 
settling the case helps to avoid the high cost that comes with diligently litigating a case, 
particularly if most of that cost will be borne by the lead counsel while the benefit will be 
shared by non-lead counsel. The market might have a positive reaction to this development 
 
 135.  We do not control for the market capitalization of the firms in these regressions. It is not entirely clear 
why the size of the firm should affect the litigation dynamics. The securities of large firms tend to be more liquid, 
but this is unlikely to be a concern in the context we study because the stock of merger targets tends to be highly 
liquid when deals are announced. One might also argue that better firms could be drawn to deals of larger firms. 
But market participants should not care about the total size of any recovery for target shareholders; instead, their 
focus should be on the size of the recovery relative to overall market capitalization. In any event, we perform 
regressions that include the log of market capitalization, and the unreported results come out largely the same. 
The biggest difference is that the standard errors for the NoTop*Control coefficient estimates in Table 5 are larger. 
 136.  Other studies use the number of complaints filed—which should correlate highly with the number of 
plaintiffs’ firms involved—as a measure of case quality. See Matthew Cain & David Solomon, A Great Game: 
The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 476 (2015) (discussing plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ use of jurisdictions with previously favorable judgments); Adam Badawi & Daniel Chen, Shareholder 
Wealth Effects of Delaware Litigation 8 (Sept. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://users.nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Delaware.pdf (noting markets’ reactions to Delaware litigation); Webber, 
Private Policing, supra note 10 (describing shareholders litigation and results). 
 137.  See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 121, at 1506 (estimating that 65% of the attorneys’ fee in merger 
litigation goes to the lead counsel and 35% to the executive committee and liaison counsel, based on telephone 
interviews with plaintiffs’ counsel). 
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because it increases the certainty that the deal will close. 
2. Robustness Checks 
One concern about our results is whether we can accurately discern a law firm effect 
when the suit is filed the day of or the day after a merger is announced, given that the 
market is still reacting to the announcement of the merger itself. That announcement may 
contain useful information beyond just the offer premium and the deal structure, including 
information that extends beyond the specifics of the transaction itself, such as the financial 
health of particular market sectors. And even if we can discern a lawsuit effect, Tables 4 
and 5 raise questions whether the market is reacting to the presence of a high quality law 
firm or, instead, is responding to the facts of the underlying case. In those cases where the 
lawsuit gets filed shortly after the announcement, we cannot discern between these two 
effects. 
Table 6138 attempts to address these concerns by examining the market reaction to 
suits filed more than two days after the deal is announced. Two days provides ample time 
for the market to price any information associated with the deal itself. This table provides 
some of the strongest support for our hypotheses. Not surprisingly, the MBO and 
controlling shareholder variables are insignificant in all specifications. The market has 
known the deal structure for at least two days. But the identity of the firm filing the suit is 
new information. While we do not find statistically significant results for law firm quality 
and controlling shareholders, the variable for top firms interacted with MBOs correlates 
with a strongly positive and statistically significant market reaction. In contrast, no top 
firms interacted with MBOs has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant in 
three of four specifications.139 Both of these results support our claim that law firm quality 
matters. The results suggest that the market does not react, at this point, to the MBO itself, 
but only to the quality of the law firm bringing suit over the MBO.140 If the market were 
reacting to deal characteristics alone, then we would expect to see no market reaction to 
firm filings two days after the deal terms are announced. The fact that we observe 
statistically significant market reactions to law firm filings two or more days after the deal 





 138.  This table presents results from OLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return as the 
dependent variable. The cumulative abnormal return covers the windows indicated in the tables. Day zero is the 
day the first complaint is filed against the target firm. Some variables, including the deal premium, indicator 
variables for whether the case was filed on the same day as the announcement, and fixed effects for year, have 
been omitted for brevity. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of 
the cumulative abnormal return. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
 139.  To limit the number of tables, we include both the top and no top firm variables. If we run separate 
tables for the top and notop variables, we see similar results (i.e., positive and statistically significant coefficients 
for the top firms interacted with MBOs in all specifications and negative and statistically significant for no top 
firms interacted with MBOs in all specifications). 
 140.  We conduct an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the top firm * MBO variable is equal to the no top 
firm * MBO variable. In all specifications we can reject the null at the one-percent level of statistical significance 
(i.e., we have substantial evidence that the abnormal returns associated with these two variables are different). 
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Another potential concern is the relatively small sample size in our study. While we 
have case data that span through calendar year 2009, we restrict our primary analysis to the 
period ranging from October 2003 (the beginning of electronic docket coverage) to 
September 15, 2008. The reason we do so is because the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
on the latter date is the event that many mark as the beginning of the most acute phase of 
the financial crisis.141 This period of the crisis involved a near-total seizure of credit 
markets. This credit crunch made financing deals difficult and, unsurprisingly, merger 
activity cratered during that time.142 The deepening of the crisis may also have given 
prospective buyers cold feet in deals that did get signed. Those putative buyers may have 
 
 141.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. 
REV. 549, 552–53 (2009) (detailing how Lehman’s bankruptcy turned the mortgage crisis into a more far-reaching 
financial panic); Adam Schell, Collapse Upended Economic Supports; Investment Bank’s Failure Nearly 
Triggered Meltdown, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2009, at 1B (observing that the Lehman bankruptcy helped produce 
“almost 6 million lost jobs. A 5,000-point Dow plunge. The government bailing out cash-starved banks. General 
Motors and Chrysler declaring Chapter 11. The unemployment rate doubling to almost 10%. Consumers getting 
$4500 handouts from Uncle Sam to buy a car. Talk of a 1930s-style depression.”). 
 142.  See Michael J. De La Merced, Mergers Hit 7-Year High, Propelled by Series of Blockbuster Deals, 
DEALBOOK (June 30, 2014, 8:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/propelled-by-a-series-of-
blockbuster-deals-mergers-hit-a-7-year-high/?_r=0 (showing a precipitous drop in merger activity after the 
quarter of the Lehman bankruptcy).  
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been more willing to walk away from a transaction as an even more dour outlook for the 
economy diminished the potential gains from a deal. 
The decline in mergers and the hesitance of prospective buyers likely dimmed the 
prospects of deal litigation for plaintiffs’ firms. For one, there were fewer cases to litigate. 
If there was no substantial change in the quality of the cases available, firms likely faced 
the choice of pursuing lesser quality cases or hardly litigating at all. Even the top-tier firms 
may have opted to take less inviting cases. The reticence of acquirers may also have 
diminished the prospect of a significant recovery for plaintiffs’ firms. Merger litigation can 
create pressure to settle a case because the parties prefer to resolve disputes prior to closing. 
If a buyer is looking for a reason to walk away, that can significantly diminish the leverage 
that plaintiffs have. Both of these reasons suggest that the relationship between law firm 
quality and the likelihood of a significant recovery may have attenuated during the post-
Lehman period.143 
Despite our belief that the financial crisis cases are different, we still include them as 
a robustness check because it allows us to increase our sample size from 125 cases to 168 
cases. Tables 7144and 8145 present the results of the same regressions as Tables 4 and 5, 
but with the inclusion of the post-Lehman cases. The results are largely similar to the 
primary analysis. The interaction term of top firm and controlling shareholder cases in 
Table 7 has very similar coefficients and standard errors as compared to Table 4. The 
coefficients for the top firm and MBO interaction term are smaller in Table 7 and the 
standard errors are somewhat larger. We likewise find similar results when comparing the 
main variables of interest in Tables 5 and 8. The NoTop and MBO interaction term 
coefficients are not significant in any of the specifications in both Tables 5 and 8. The 
NoTop and controlling shareholder interaction term coefficients are, however, highly 
similar in both tables, as are the standard errors. We view the substantial similarity of the 
results both with and without the post-Lehman cases as further evidence in support of our 
hypothesis about the connection between law firm quality and the response of market 
 
 143.  The descriptive statistics for the post-Lehman period provide support for these expectations about the 
change in case mix. For the pre-Lehman period the number of cases that are MBOs and/or a controlling 
shareholder transaction is over 27%. The comparable statistic for the post-Lehman cases is less than 14%. There 
are also fewer cases filed in short order. While a third of cases in the pre-Lehman period were filed on the day of 
deal announcement or the day after, just less than 13% were filed in that time frame for the post-Lehman cases. 
Though we are hesitant to read too much into these descriptive statistics, it is possible that the increased delay 
reflects some increased uncertainty about whether to file a case. 
 144.  This table presents results from OLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return as the 
dependent variable. The cumulative abnormal return covers the windows indicated in the tables. Day zero is the 
day the first complaint is filed against the target firm. Some variables, including the deal premium, indicator 
variables for whether the case was filed on the same day as the announcement, and fixed effects for year, have 
been omitted for brevity. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of 
the cumulative abnormal return. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
 145.  This table presents results from OLS regressions that use the cumulative abnormal return as the 
dependent variable. The cumulative abnormal return covers the windows indicated in the tables. Day zero is the 
day the first complaint is filed against the target firm. Some variables, including the deal premium, indicator 
variables for whether the case was filed on the same day as the announcement, and fixed effects for year, have 
been omitted for brevity. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance associated with estimate of 
the cumulative abnormal return. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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participants. 
 Table 7: Higher Quality Law Firms and Abnormal Returns to Filing with the 
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Table 8: Lower Quality Law Firms and Abnormal Returns to Filing with the Inclusion 
























The evidence presented broadly confirms our hypothesis that law firm quality matters 
in controlling shareholder transactions and MBOs. In these transactions, cases with top 
firms tend to correlate with an increase in the target’s stock price, whereas cases with low 
quality firms and no top firms negatively correlate with the target’s stock price. Because 
managers and controlling shareholders have access to inside information or may favorably 
time an acquisition in the business cycle, both courts and the market scrutinize them with 
greater care than third-party acquisitions. Top firms may select better cases, or may litigate 
them better, whereas poor quality firms are less selective, and may succeed only in delaying 
the deal without any prospect for a bump in the price of the target’s shares. Hence, the 
negative market reaction to them.  
As noted in the Introduction, skeptics take the position that law firm quality does not 
matter at all in deal litigation. To the extent that there is price improvement beyond the 
initial offer price, skeptics would argue that the improvement is attributable to factors other 
than the lawsuit or the law firm itself, like deal characteristics. Our data suggests that this 
view is incorrect. In conflict-ridden transactions like MBOs and controlling shareholder 
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deals, markets appear to react positively to suits filed by top-quality plaintiff law firms, 
and negatively to suits filed by poor quality firms. The results hold for cases filed more 
than two days after the deal is announced, by which time all deal characteristics are known 
and should be reflected in market prices. Although our data do not allow us to claim that 
litigation itself is value-adding, we can conclude that, conditional upon there being a 
lawsuit, there is some utility to the effort exerted by courts and institutional clients to sift 
for plaintiff law firm quality. At a minimum, the information about the law firms that file 
cases sends some signal either about the underlying quality of the case or about the value 
that those firms are likely to produce, or perhaps both. Our results show that markets listen 
to those signals.  
APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Number of Plaintiff Firms:  The number of plaintiff firms filing suit in a 
case.  
Top Firms: One of the top firms, as defined by Legal 500 
and SCAS’s ranking, has filed a complaint in the 
case.  
Lower and No Top Firms: Bottom three firms of the Bloomberg attorney 
fee rankings, or firms that have been criticized 
by Vice Chancellor Laster or Vice Chancellor 
Lamb have filed in the case AND none of the 
top firms have filed a complaint. 
MBO: The case involves an acquisition where a 
company’s existing managers acquire a large 
part or all of the company. 
Top*MBO: Interaction term for the Top Firm and MBO 
variables. 
NoTop*MBO Interaction term for the Lower and No Top 
Firms and MBO variables. 
Controlling Shareholder The case involves an acquisition where a 
company’s controlling shareholder(s) acquire(s) 
a large part or all of the company. 
Top*Control Interaction term for the Top Firm and 
Controlling Shareholder variables. 
NoTop*Control Interaction term for the Lower and No Top firms 
and Controlling Shareholder variables. 
Premium  Difference between price offered by acquirer 
and the pre-offer trading price of the target’s 
stock in percentage terms. 
